The February 12 general election in Bangladesh — the first since the violent July 2024 uprising that forced then Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to flee — is being closely watched by India for potential shifts in regional geopolitics that could impact national security and alter the balance of power in South Asia.
From New Delhi’s perspective, three interlinked concerns stand out. Chief among them is the possibility of a Pakistan-China-Bangladesh alignment that could dilute India’s strategic influence in the region. Border security, illegal migration, and reports of anti-Hindu incidents in Bangladesh also weigh heavily on India’s calculations.
India-Bangladesh ties, which were largely stable under Hasina’s Awami League government, have become more uncertain since her exit. While New Delhi would have preferred continuity under Hasina, it recognises the political transition underway in Dhaka.
If the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) forms the government, India is unlikely to react with immediate alarm. BNP leader Tarique Rahman, who returned from exile after the death of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia in December 2025, has indicated that his administration would respect India’s interests. However, questions remain about how the party would function under his leadership, given past allegations and its history of adopting positions seen as less favourable to India.
Concerns could deepen if the hardline Jamaat-e-Islami plays a significant role in government formation. A stronger Islamist influence in Dhaka could strain bilateral ties and potentially push Bangladesh closer to China and Pakistan. Beijing already has a growing footprint in Bangladesh through major infrastructure investments, including the modernisation of Mongla Port. Indian analysts view China’s expanding presence in South Asia, including in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, as part of a broader strategic pattern in the Indian Ocean Region.
A shift toward Pakistan, even informally, could raise fears in India about increased security challenges along its eastern flank, particularly in the sensitive northeastern states. Any instability in that region could also intersect with India’s ongoing tensions with China, including over Arunachal Pradesh.
Border management remains another key issue. India and Bangladesh share a 4,100-km-long border that is densely populated and politically sensitive. Illegal migration is a contentious political issue in West Bengal and Assam, both of which are heading into elections. Since the July 2024 upheaval in Bangladesh, Indian authorities have reported a rise in infiltration attempts, prompting tighter security measures.
The safety of Bangladesh’s Hindu minority, which makes up around eight per cent of the population, is also under scrutiny. Reports of attacks on Hindu homes, businesses and temples after Hasina’s departure have led India to raise concerns through diplomatic channels and issue travel advisories. Dhaka has acknowledged some incidents but said many were linked to non-communal disputes.
Trade ties form another critical pillar of the relationship. Bilateral trade stands at around $14 billion annually, with India enjoying a significant surplus. Bangladesh is heavily reliant on Indian cotton yarn for its readymade garments sector, a cornerstone of its economy. While a new government in Dhaka might consider diversifying suppliers, economic realities could encourage continuity and stability in trade relations.
Ultimately, India’s focus will be on the intent and capacity of the next Bangladeshi government — particularly its willingness to cooperate on border management, security concerns and maintaining regional balance. For New Delhi, a stable and friendly Dhaka remains key to preventing additional strategic pressure along its eastern frontier while it manages ongoing challenges with China and Pakistan. (Agencies)
