Jammu, April 27: The High Court has quashed the preventive detention of Doda MLA Mehraj Malik under the Public Safety Act (PSA), ruling that the allegations against him do not meet the legal threshold of “public order” and instead fall within the domain of “law and order.”
Malik was detained on September 8, 2025, and had remained in custody since then. With the High Court setting aside the detention order, he has secured relief after spending approximately 223 days in jail under preventive detention.
In a detailed judgment, the court observed that the material relied upon by the authorities—including multiple FIRs and Daily Diary Reports (DDRs)—failed to establish any proximate or live link between the alleged activities of the MLA and the need for preventive detention.
The court noted that several FIRs cited in the detention dossier dated back as far as 2014, with some cases over a decade old. It further recorded that certain cases were related to violations of the Model Code of Conduct during elections, while others had already been withdrawn or compounded. Such material, the court held, could not justify invoking the stringent provisions of the PSA.
A key finding of the court was that the allegations, even if taken at face value, pointed to issues of “law and order” rather than “public order.” It emphasized that preventive detention laws like the PSA can only be invoked in cases where activities pose a serious threat to the community or public at large, and not for isolated or routine breaches of law.
Significantly, the court’s ruling comes against the backdrop of widespread unrest that had swept the Doda and Kishtwar districts following Malik’s detention. The arrest had triggered protests, clashes, and heightened tensions in several areas, prompting authorities to impose curfew-like restrictions and suspend internet services for a period to prevent escalation of the situation.
The court also expressed reservations over the reliance on DDR entries and generalized allegations, observing that such inputs lack the evidentiary value required to curtail personal liberty under preventive detention laws.
Importantly, the bench underscored that the ordinary criminal justice system was sufficient to deal with the allegations against the MLA, and that preventive detention cannot be used as a substitute for regular legal proceedings.
The judgment further raised concerns over the manner in which the detention dossier was prepared, noting apparent inconsistencies and the inclusion of additional cases at a later stage, casting doubt on the genuineness of the exercise.
Holding that the detention order was not legally sustainable, the court directed that the same be set aside, reaffirming the fundamental right to personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The ruling is significant as it reiterates the legal distinction between “law and order” and “public order,” and reinforces the principle that preventive detention laws must be applied with strict adherence to constitutional safeguards.
